We recommend reading [this flipside crypto report on DAO to DAO collaboration](https://data.flipsidecrypto.xyz/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Flipside-Governance-Analysis-of-a-DAO-to-DAO-Partnership.pdf) between Aave and Balancer. >Community members of these two DAOs saw something profound in what the other had to offer. Some complimentary capability paired with the deep expertise and trust that comes from time-tested smart contracts. This report will give you good insight first into what Aave and Balancer actually are and smattering of the history about how they came to be. It provides some high-level data-driven insights into what the protocols do and how well they do it. It is really interesting to see the difference between Uniswap (an [[2. AMMs|AMM]] made up of pools that only have two types of tokens) and Balancer (An "Automated Portfolio Manager" made up of pools with up to 8 different kinds of token) and how this translates to differences in both the TVL and the strategy that these different protocols adopt. >the true unlock is engaging another community. In detailing some of the history, FC also does a good job of describing Balancer's move to a "voting escrow" system similar to Curve, which they describe in greater detail [here](https://medium.com/flipside-governance/to-ve-or-not-to-ve-9e3d14d4ccc5). We also appreciate the deep explanation of the mechanics of this particular DAO to DAO partnership, what the benefits are to both, and the detailed insights into what boosted Balancer pools actually are and why they work the way they do. This explanation (on page 31), coupled with the history of yield bearing tokens they provide (from page 34 onwards), is well worth reading in full. The even deeper insights into risk assessments done by people who might even have some idea how to do such a thing is fascinating, especially this part: >liquidating LP tokens is very different to liquidating the individual tokens of a liquidity position. If LP tokens have to be sold during a liquidation, their sale removes liquidity at the very time that it is needed most, and increases the risk of bad debt and high slippage during liquidations. Some of the speculative ideas presented around GHO make for an interesting end to the report and will give you further insights into some of the same ideas that Kernel presents [here](https://www.kernel.community/en/tokens/token-studies/maker-difference) The data that FC have been able to gather and present is really interesting and will provide you with many more insights than the report itself if you consider it deeply and take your time to reflect on some of it. For instance, FC makes the point that only 0.7% of the circulating supply of Aave has been involved (ever!) in voting on proposals, but then seems to forget this later when analysing the governance process (a forum + snapshot proposals), saying: >Over 151 on-chain and 496 Snapshot polls have occurred to make Aave what it is today. Active governance at its finest. This seems to us to illustrate some of the deep, architectural problems in how we conceive of token-holder governance today (in 2023). [Kernel recommends a different model](https://www.kernel.community/en/tokens/#the-cost-of-decisions) in which funds are distributed *by virtue of how governance works*, rather than after the fact of a vote being taken by a few, well-resourced people.